Interview with Paul Ylvisaker
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Walter's first question has to do with my family background and education. I come from a family third generation Norwegian immigrants. My father's side were theological, educators, ministers; my mother's side ... a ship captain, sailor. Both father and mother were musicians, my father a college president.

I grew up in Minnesota.

(WMP: What college was he president of?)

President of Bethany Lutheran Junior College, which I attended, also taught at, at one time. Went on from there to state teachers' college. And then, a lucky break, got a fellowship in 1944 to Harvard University for graduate work in government and economics. Got my master's and doctor's at Harvard, taught there 'til 1948. Then to Swarthmore College where I taught from '48 to '55.

(WMP: Paul, who attracted you down there?)

It was Jim Perkins, actually, who was vice-president of the college at the time, and John Nason. And it was one of those... couldn't have been a happier thing... young family life... kids came on at that point. And spent one year in Britain as a Fulbright Fellow, the year in which, as I recall, Joe and Dilworth made it first into office. Was it 1951 or '52 or something like that.

(WMP: '51 they took office. They got elected in '51, took office in '52.)

'52. And that's when I was in England. So I was not part of the immediate campaign at the time. Though I guess I have to admit, until 1952 I was a Republican.

(WMP: Were you?)

The thing that turned it from the Republicans, apart from national policy, was McClure and the Delaware County team... gang!

(WMP: That's right. You were living down in his bailiwick, weren't you.)
That's right. And became the Democratic chairman for my little town of Swarthmore.

(WMP: Did you?)

Yup.

(WMP: I didn't know that.)

Yup. Well, it wasn't hard...there were twenty-one votes cast and I got all twenty-one, to my embarrassment, because my ethics told me I was supposed to vote against myself. Clearly, I didn't.

So that I was a young professor in political science then at Swarthmore.

Your second question has to do with how I got in...how Joe Clark found me....really, for this job.

Well, I can still remember it. We had Bob Moses out to speak at the Quaker Meeting House in 1954 or '5. And Joe Clark came out with Ed Bacon to listen to Bob Moses. I got up to introduce Bob and found out that Bob hadn't prepared a speech....which he told me....we were paying good money for it, and it was supposed to be published as a book and everything...and just before I got up to introduce him, Bob Moses turned to me and he said... ...let's see...what's my topic for tonight?

And I told him his topic for tonight and he said .....well, okay. He got up and spoke from notes on the back of an airplane ticket that I happened to know had no notes on it at all.

He lasted for twelve minutes and I was stuck in front of the audience with Bob Moses having disappointed us.

Then, so I took a shot at Bob Moses, in a way. It had been a nice introduction and I figured if he disappointed us I could let him have it.....and must have said something that Joe Clark liked. Because a few days later, Pete Schaffler, who was working in the office, called up and said .....Joe's looking for an executive secretary to replace Hal Enarson,* and he'd like to talk to you. He's debating between you and a newspaper guy. I don't know who the other fellow was.

I was at that time committed to teaching at Swarthmore. That must have been more than a couple of days....must have been a couple of months afterward...because I was committed to teach the next fall and Joe wanted me to come on, I think, during the middle of the summer, or something like that.

*Harold Enarson, presently president of the University of Ohio.
When I asked him, and I think you've got a question here, 
...it says, what were your qualifications for the job?... 
I asked Joe that, and he thought for a moment, and he said, 
...well, it's to help fight the battle for my mind. 

(WMP: That was egotistical.)

Beautiful thing to throw at me! For the first time I felt 
maybe I did have qualifications for it because I...you know, 
I could at least argue. Where I'd felt inadequate was that 
I didn't know a thing about Philadelphia, except when I went 
in to shop occasionally and to go to the theatre or something. 
But I didn't know the names of the members, felt very inade­
quate about having never really been in a tight tough office 
like that.

But when he said...help fight the battle for my mind....it 
was beautifully put as a challenge to me and I loved it. I 
could see myself in that role.

Hal Enarson, when finally the mayor decided to ask me to do 
it...because he was torn between having, as he liked, bright 
young people with good connections, and a Harvard background 
didn't hurt at all with Joe....he was torn between that kind 
of a person and the newspaperman. He said he'd feel like an 
old shoe. And then he finally asked me to do it.

I had a hard time getting away from Swarthmore because I had 
to teach that year. It was too late. And so, I finally 
worked it out that Pete Schauffler and I would divide teach­
ing and I continued to teach. Then, I had another job at 
the time, which was public administration cases. I was edi­
tor of the Inter-university program that produced cases. 
And it took me another six months to find a successor. So 
actually the first half of my year with Joe, I had three jobs; 
the second half I had two. And I was scrambling back and 
forth between these, with effects which I'll mention in just 
a moment.

(WMP: Hal Enarson left then, when you came in, didn't he?)

Yes. Hal had already decided to go. He was going to Western 
State Compact on Higher Education...WSCHE. And he took me 
aside as my mentor and told me that my role should 
be the Charlie Murphy of City Hall. Because Hal had been in 
the White House of Truman, and he had these rather big ideas 
about what a staff person to Joe, the secretary should be. He 
should be a thinking person; he should be thinking out ahead 
in long run terms. And Pete Schauffler nicely fell into that, 
because Pete really wanted the executive office, mostly by him­
self. He was administrative assistant, I think. And they ar­
ranged that I would take Hal's office which was just across the 
hall, where I discovered you could think in sublime isolation
and be privy to nothing. And I sat there for a while, when I first came on, feeling utterly inadequate, because I didn't know the flow of things. Mike Byrne was then the deputy mayor; Mike, Pete and I were the staff who met each morning. They all seemed to know everything. They had everything to do that was of importance and somehow or another, I was supposed to sit across the hall and think.

But Hal had told me one other thing which I didn't forget. He said...you should also make Joe Clark senator. And that means Joe should get national exposure, he should be writing an article for the Atlantic Monthly and you should be drafting that, and things like that.

Well that didn't help me too much either, because I didn't know how to make a man a senator. I wasn't even sure I knew what article to write.

But within a matter of two weeks, I had decided not to be isolated. And I moved across the hall into Joe's office where I became part of the stream of things. And the first thing that he asked me to do, he was a little uncomfortable trying to figure out what I should be doing...he had to put out his budget, as I recall, and he asked if I would proof-read it. And I thought, My God, the difference between proofing the budget and making a man senator and thinking great thoughts....I'll take proof-reading!

So I took the proof-reading and Joe was so startled to see me accept a menial job that easily, and I did a good job and did it, and he looked at me in a new light, and began then passing to me things that really...you know...day to day counted and gave me a chance to catch up with things.

Let me shoot forward through the whole year then I'll return to these questions.

It was always nervous time with Joe. He was so damned sharp and smart, you were always feeling slightly inadequate when he would come at you with these barking questions or peremptory stances on things, that it increased my tension level; I felt inadequate in many ways, and it turned out that in December, the weight of all this and the number of jobs that I was trying to do, got to me apparently, and without my knowing it, in December, I had a coronary. It happened one day... we were out dedicating the water treatment plant or sewage treatment plant out by the airport...just one of those morning
things...we went out, a capital project that Ed Bacon had got through and whatever...or Bailey, I guess it was at the time...and I can remember feeling heavy in my chest coming back. And then Walter, you may not remember, but you and I walked the streets that day talking about Joe Clark. I have a vivid memory of it. And I was feeling my feet dragging, went home early after the Christmas party, and went up the hill from Swarthmore and got these familiar chest pains and so forth.

It turned out that the doctor did not recognize it. And he just told me to take off for two days, which I did. Two days later I played seventeen sets of tennis.

(WMP: Seventeen sets!)

Yes, without knowing that I'd had a coronary two days before.

(WMP: It's a wonder you're alive today!)

Well, I think it was my salvation. And it wasn't until January a month later, that my uncle, a medical examiner, found it on my EKG. And then I got packed off to the hospital, you know, with all the melancholy that follows, for a week, where they checked me out. And I came back, told Joe that the doctors had told me that I shouldn't stay in that cauldron any longer.

Joe, and this is the mark of the man, by this time knew that he was going to go for the Senate, and was hoping that I would stay with him and go down to Washington. And he took me in hand when I got a little droopy and said...well, Joe, I've got an offer to go to the Ford Foundation, which had happened before I found out about the coronary. And I said I think I'm going to go because I don't have enough life insurance and I can get group life insurance over there. And Joe looked at me and he said...why do you want life insurance? I said, because of my family, my wife. Joe said...I've seen your wife, she's a beautiful woman...a year after you die, she's going to be married and probably won't remember you.

(WMP: That sounds like Joe Clark.)

And I said...Damn you, Joe...I mean, if she's that good, then I want to stick around to enjoy her. And then he said...no, you're still taking it...you know, stick around. This is going to be as good for you as anything.

And then the next day, the managing director, Buck......

(WMP: Sawyer.)

Sawyer, died of a heart attack.
Next day. And Joe looked at me and I looked at Joe and he said....we probably better not trust our luck.

Precious, yea...precious luck. So I agreed to go with Ford starting in May or June, and Joe converted me into a consultant around March or something like that, so that there was an overlap. So my time with Joe was about a year.

But the irony of it is, that I'd begun to pick up and be effective. I knew; I had a good feeling about the work about the time of Christmas, so that rather than getting less involved, I became more involved in the day-to-day. And just to repeat, we got a number of things done.

One was, I got Joe ....'member a lot of us were on into take up the natural gas fight. And I can still...we can talk in more detail about that episode. But soon we were heading the campaign of all the mayors in the country to stop the deregulation of natural gas. And that was a huge thing that got him a lot of national attention.

I also did help him write the article which he got in Atlantic Monthly, after having it rejected a couple of times, which gave him national exposure. And tried also to argue him into staying as mayor for another term, predicting that it was going to be a gradual downhill after his going. And he said something to me I'll never forget. I said....Joe, if you don't run again, Dilworth will be next, and as you know, he had not much love for Dilworth, and Tate will be after that, and who knows after that. And I said, you just owe it.

And he said....well, Paul, you've got to understand one thing. I'm not that dedicated a man.

He said, ....if I can get that Senate slot, that's where I'm going. And, as we all know, that's where he went. How else he'd want to argue that, I don't know. But we became, during that time, very close. We established a very good working relationship, and I'll never forget, as a young man, when one day, he put his arm around me at a party, and said....you and I are sympatico.......a show of affection, really, that was uncharacteristic from Joe. But for me as a young man, it just suddenly I felt like I had arrived on the world scene and God himself had anointed me. And from that day on, I've had this deep respect for the man and an affection that has been deep.

He, at a critical time later, when I became a state commissioner in New Jersey, was responsible for persuading me to work
with Dick Hughes*. Dick Hughes and he are not the same background, but he said ....Dick Hughes has to be one of the best men in politics that I know. And I'll never regret having taken that assignment. He also encouraged me to get the hell out of the Ford Foundation, 'cause he didn't think much of that kind of work either.

But, I'm running ahead of myself. Those are some personal vignettes that kind of explain the whole year with Joe Clark and it went from a stumbling kid who didn't know nuthin', to somebody who felt much more assured and helpful by the time the year was over and it was an extremely good year for me.

(WMP: That's very interesting...very interesting.)

Now. How would you assess Joe Clark's executive abilities. Uh...you have to give him very high marks for his analytical capacity...give him higher marks for results in the sense that he ..un..it was a good mayorship. It did do some dramatic things in that city's history. He brought together extraordinarily able people. I think in many ways the quality of that cabinet could have been national as well as local. And he kept us all respecting him, even if at times angry, sometimes feeling out of it, feeling pushed over, you know, all those things that Joe could make you feel.

And I think the most telling thing that I could recall from that about Joe as an administrator, or an executive, was when the cabinet became very....was very restive, feeling kind of out of it, as I'd felt out of it, and we got Red Sommers, as I recall, from Haverford College, to come in and appraise the mayor-cabinet relationships. And when Red reported, he had...the bottom line was this. The morale of the cabinet is low because they don't feel consulted by Joe, or really listened to on major issues. And what makes their morale even lower, is that if he had consulted them, they would have told him to do what he had already known what to do.

(WMP: You're talking about the cabinet and not the commissioners.)

Ah well, the cabinet, the commissioners in that sense, I mean the whole group of us, who,...I think we met as a cabinet, didn't we?

(WMP: Yes, every once a month...once a week.)

Once a week, yea.

(WMP: And once a month, I think he had meetings with his whole ...all the commissioners.)

* Richard J. Hughes, Democrat, governor of New Jersey 1962-'70
I think this was the cabinet, not the commissioners. But I suspect probably the same thing would have gone for commissioners in spades.

But you therefore, have to say, that one of his virtues may also have been his liability....that his extraordinary quickness to sense a situation and come to good political judgments about what to do about it. He was so fast, you recall, he told me, at least, this story, ...I don't know if it's accurate, but the way he became mayor rather than Dilworth, was that Dilworth hesitated too long. By the time Dilworth had made up his mind, he had filed his papers, and did not feel as though he were... there was a breach with Dilworth to do that. But he said he just couldn't let Dilworth hang around. There was a vacuum and he moved into it and filed his papers. Is that accurate, Walter? I remember that vividly.

(WMP: There was something along that line. It was pretty complicated, Paul, I don't know whether we should take the time to hear about it. I will tell you though, if you want.)

Yeah.

(WMP: There was a group that felt Joe would make the better first mayor. Joe was controller and had proved himself very well in the job of controller. Dick had to take the second spot which was treasurer, which was not a ministerial kind of a job.)

Right.

(WMP: And Dick had, however, been the one to run in 1947, when it was a hopeless kind of a cause. And he did it so well that it put Clark and Dilworth on the map and that's how it was that they were able to run in 1949. And at that point, Dick was a good sporting fellow...said, Now, Joe, it's your turn to have the top spot. And he got the top spot, and ran for controller. There he was able to do things; controller is a much more important job. And he established himself as a very astute, able fellow in the eyes of the public and winning some of the Establishment people in the city.

But when it came for the mayoralty, there were people who said ....well now, Joe has proved himself as controller, and so on, and they wanted him ...and I was one of those, too...they were drafting Joe for running for mayor and somehow we managed to re-new ..... manoeuvre that thing. Dick had made some kind of promise to Joe... Dick had run for governor while he was treasurer.....)

That's right. I remember that.

(WMP: And that so put him behind the eightball that he didn't
make it, and there was a group of us who said...we don't want Dick, who's just climbing around any old way, we want Joe...and Dick's wife and his law partners were trying to push him in to...get him slotted for mayor. But Dick said...well, I couldn't stay for that and he disappeared in New York for about ten days or two weeks, while his partners were fighting for him to get the nomination for mayor. And there was a committee which I and Ada Lewis and several other people had formed to draft Clark for mayor. And then it came right down to Jim Finneghan, who was the chairman of the party, to hand in the thing, and the...Jack Kelly, Jim Clark, a couple of others, Matt McCloskey, were the men who were in control of getting the nomination, really. And Finneghan was working with them.

Well, they were debating what to do, as to who would be the part, and they couldn't seem to make up their minds, so someone broke in the newspapers that it could come to a crisis, so Joe decided...well, the only way to handle this is to just announce for mayor.

So he did. He walked over to the City Committee, where they were meeting at the time...Greenfield, it was at the where they were meeting. And he told them, and they said...well you didn't discuss with anyone...and he said.....oh, I'm sorry. It was already in the newspaper....you can't retract it now. So that's how it worked.)

I see. He's a very assertive guy, and very decisive. And that is a quality, I think, in a good executive. One can second-guess a lot of those things, but I think you'd have to... ...his batting average must have been as high as anybody's, for a man who made those quick decisions.

He also....I had the feeling, you know, you have to discount a lot of what I feel, perhaps, in perspective, because, for me, this was exploding into an exciting new world, you know. And he could easily take on heroic size for me....you always tend to fall in love with your boss, anyway, in a power situation.

Your fifth question comes naturally....how did Clark inspire his staff and the cabinet members and commissioners to perform at the maximum of their abilities. A strange combination of things. First of all, he did create an aura, or let's say maybe he benefited from the aura that all of you created at the time...of a great mission.

He told me something. When he was in India during the war, he and.....
That's right. With Stratemeyer.

Flying the hump. And he said that he and Chei Morrison from New Orleans, and Quig Newton from Denver... how they got together, I don't know, but they made a resolve during the war to come back and make America better. And to go into politics and do it. And it was interesting that the three of them ended up as mayors of major cities in the United States.

And he often referred... we talked about occasionally... about that resolve. So when he did come back, and you had started it early in the forties, at least by my memories, Dilworth had gone to the streets first, I guess, in a rough, tough way....Joe came in along that. Joe reaped in many ways, because of that aggressiveness of his, the prime job from what was really a coalition effort in Philadelphia. But it was just the time too, when America wanted to be inspired, when you could have symbolically that lousy Republican regime that you could knock off....and then, dramatically challenge the Chinese wall, the railroad, and say we're going to make this place suitable for living. That was the aura we came into. So that the environment, really, had us all working at the top of our ability. We were dedicated people.

Second thing was Joe's... that very formidable intelligence and spirit of his. Fear motivated you partly. If he ever got mad at you, you know it, Walter, you and I got...

Yea, well, I want to make a footnote on that. We used to talk about why Joe barked so much at Walter.

Ohhhhh, yea. Pete Schauffler and the rest of us would sit around and speculate the psychological reasons why Walter always got it in the neck!!! And we came to this conclusion; that you and he both came from the aristocratic background of Philadelphia... you know....I don't say that in any but a descriptive way... I think he had the feeling that he could, like a brother, go bark at you and you got to be a
good frustration-reliever for him. I thought you took it awfully well.

(WMP: I used to provoke him sometimes, deliberately.)

Well, I think in many ways you have some ...on the circle of virtues, yours are on the opposite side of him in many ways. He would be immediate, decisive, not reflective. You were reflective, constantly turning things around in a new way...you wanted to see it in 360° before you proceeded.

So partly what he was doing was barking at his opposite qualities, you know, in that sense. But I think it was because he had the confidence that he could do it and you would not misunderstand...that somehow or another, you had a capacity...it's not fair to you, but you had a capacity to take all these slings and arrows without ...you know, you never got....I never saw you threaten to resign or get up in a huff or anything like that. You just knew that was Joe...you'd lived with him a long time...

(WMP: It was kind of a compliment. He treated me as if I was his equal.)

That's right. He did.

(WMP: Which the others weren't....he didn't do that to them.)

Exactly. Because with people of lower stature, or whatever, lower intelligence, he would muffle a lot of his feelings.

Now, there was therefore, this kind of fear that you were going to be the next one barked at. And I'll never forget, just to give you a little example, one day ....

(WMP: Everybody made it.)

Oh, everybody. Oh. I think Mike Byrne was one of the few who could laugh and understand, and Joe did...they were a Mutt and Jeff team. But the rest of us knew that the...like Jehovah, Joe's wrath would throw, you know, a bolt at you.

And then one day, when I was...he had asked me to prepare for his radio show a program, a speech, a text. So I waded through and I came back and I told him I think he ought to explain the budget process. And he said....Paul,...that's a good idea.....'cause it was budget time. So he said...okay, write it up....
So I wrote up the script. Five minutes before he was due at the radio station, I was still dictating a speech to Jean, the secretary there, and she had...I would say, for a half an hour radio program, she had the first twenty-two minutes done. And then I didn't know where to go from there. And I was...my heart was in my throat! Joe came up behind me and put out his arms, and I thought....he was going to hit me! I really thought that I was gonna get slugged!

Instead, he reached around, put his arm around my shoulder and felt my heart...he said....beatin' pretty fast, Paul. And then, in a singularly nice way, he took the script, went down to the radio station, he read it in the car...said it was good, read it word for word, up to the point where he had to go eight more minutes, and as though he were reading, he read right through, in perfect sentence structure, perfect logic, right to the end, and turned around and then smiled at me....he said....turned out all right, didn't it. And then there was that implication....the next time, damn you, you better have the whole speech written!

But he was .....there was kind of....it gives the mood of the person for me. And there's a tension of wanting to perform, and then occasionally, and I think I benefited most...more than most people...there was that...the sun would break through, and we would feel that the man was merciful. But it made me, as a result of that, say, you know I'll work for Joe Clark 'til death's door.

I finally broke away from Joe, not because of the coronary, because I recognize what happens when you work as a junior to a man too long.

(WMP: Yeah.)

You take on his personality....his personality is not my personality. And so I thought partly to protect my identity as well as my health, I should not go with him, even though, even after I went to Ford he tried to get me back several times to go down to Washington with him.

But I think there was a combination of these things that made people work hard for Joe. I think it must have made him very angry. I'll give you another incident. He didn't like the damned pigeons around City Hall and the mess they made. And one morning in staff meeting, after, I forget who it was, Pete Schauffler said he'd seen three commissioners, and Mike Byrne said he'd done this and everything else, Joe just says....damn it! the pigeons are still messing the place up. Now let's go. Call up ....who would it have been...streets or public works or something?

(WMP: Property.)
Property. That's right. Yeah, who was that guy?

(WMP: Forde? No it wasn't Forde. I've forgotten who it was.)

Anyway, he insisted we went out as a troupe....we walked for an hour around the whole building while he pointed out where it was messy and everything else. Well, for the next three days people were out there cleaning it all up and everything...you know, he was feeling better...well you know very well the pigeons were smarter than Joel and so it went back into the old condition again!

(WMP: Were you there when Ed Bacon proposed tearing down City Hall?)

No. But I was there the day that Freddy Mann, who as you recall, dropped out as Recreation Commissioner. And Joe and Mike Byrne knew they wanted to keep Freddy Mann emotionally on board; they knew his susceptibility. So they invented a cabinet position without portfolio for Freddy Mann. And again, there was that kind of...it was a kind of political...what would you call it, wisdom or craftiness, that Joe had. But, I think probably I've described it as best I can, the mood of it. I do know that I was fulfilled in working for him but couldn't have kept it going for much longer. I think I just had to distinguish my personality from his.

Let's try number six, here. Do you recall some of the major issues and problems which Clark had to cope with and how he dealt with them?

Well, let's take the ones during the year I was there, or the ones I felt identified with, because he was working on a whole lot of other issues as well. So this is...you're going to get other people talking about their perceptions.

(WMP: Yeah.)

Let's just take for granted that he was leading the way for municipal reform, that he was getting the physical redevelopment of the city which got to be known as the first stage of urban renewal. He was interested in, as a patrician, I think, in the issues of equity, social equality, .....strange, he came from a different background, but became a champion of the Blacks and others...although he gave...to give a hint as to how he felt, one day he said....Paul, the political secret you've got to remember is....speak as a liberal, but always make sure that the banker will give you credit.

And there's this ambivalence that Joe constantly showed. I think that, understandably he worked with a generation of Black leadership which didn't fit in the 1960's. They may have survived in fateful influence, but the city was going increasingly toward
Black and Italian and so forth. Joe was not easy with anything but the aristocratic leadership of those groups. And... but partly in fairness to him, the other leadership wasn't yet visible, and was pretty well muffled.

Well, another...some of the issues. One I mentioned before was natural gas. The... and this tore at Joe's origins.... the year before, Douglas and others had won the fight on natural gas, keeping it regulated, and Joe was being besieged by the league of municipalities, Pat Healey, and also by...who was the head of the...Charley Frazier, from...what is it, UGI?

(WMP: Yes, he was UGI, and then he came into the city government.)

That's right. He was out when I was there. Yeah. But he was pressing Joe to take the leadership nationally, for the mayors on the fight of the regulation. Joe quietly didn't respond. And finally one day, I said, Joe...cause Pat Healey had called me up and said...Paul, work on him. Find out why he isn't taking a lead. So I said...Joe, why aren't you?

(WMP: For the record, would you identify Pat Healey?)

Oh, Pat Healey was the head of the National League of Cities or the American League...Municipal League at the time, I guess it was. And so I said... Joe, here is the pressure on you. Why aren't you acting? It's a natural position to take. You are mayor of one of the largest eastern consumer cities. The mayors of the cities, mostly, will follow.....And I said, Joe, is it because of your oil interests? We knew old Avery Island, I guess....somebody told me that.

And he said...No, it's not that.....he said....But Dave Lawrence is close to the Mellons and I need him to get to be senator, and I'm afraid Dave, if I take off on this issue, is going to cut me out.

And I said.....Have you ever talked to Dave? .....he said, .... No....I said....Why don't you reach for the 'phone and ask him.

And he reached for the 'phone, and called Dave Lawrence, and Dave, as you know, didn't care much for Joe, in many ways...

(WMP: They were different kind of people.)

Different entirely. And Joe said....well after all the niceties and so forth....said.....Hey Dave, what about this natural gas issue...I'm thinking a little bit about moving into it.....and thundering from the other end of the 'phone was.....well it's about time, Joe! Damned!.....he said....last year I was the one that carried the message down from the White House down to Key West where Truman was, and got him to veto that bill. Why are you so slow?
And Joe, listening to this, looked at me and his eyes go wide, you know. And inside of an hour, we set up the committee with Wagner and Dick Dailey and others, that, as you remember, won the day. And Joe spent an inordinate amount of time on that one.

(WMP: You might state what the issue was.)

The issue was, that the oil interests...the same issue as is alive right now...wanted to get out of regulation of prices on delivery of natural gas, because the old arguments, we don't have an incentive to go out and explore, it's socialism and all the rest. And for Joe and for the mayors of most of the cities, it was a matter of protecting the consumer against what we've seen historically always happens when you de-regulate.

And Joe told me at the time.....Paul, this is not going to be for me an issue ....how'd he put it....kind of a labor of love. Because immediately, he got hit by the men of wealth who were in the oil business in Philadelphia. And they thought, nationally and whatever his social syndicate, almost disowned him. They couldn't understand why he would go up against them and his own interests, his personal interests, his social background.

But Joe had made a very hard calculation. First of all, this was a natural posture to be in, for the mayor of Philadelphia, and, if he were going to get to be the senator and to be a national figure, he had to ....this was a likely one.

And it paid off. I did a lot of the staff work for him. We got the mayors of the country together. He went and testified under savage questioning from the Senate, or House, or people from the oil interests ....you know, the oil lobby came up against him. And I watched Joe handle, you know, at a level of intricacy, the facts and numbers of the oil industry, and prices and regulation. Dies....remember? I think it was, of Texas? Was it Dies?

(WMP: I guess so, I don't know.)

The number of these people, who were no slouches themselves, threw up everything they could against Joe and he handled it. So his testimony was extraordinarily effective and as you know, we won that fight that year. And it did ingratiate him clearly, with Dave Lawrence, which helped in that final thing.

Another issue, at the time, I remember, was juvenile delinquency, the beginning of the youth gangs....were starting at that time. This was the mid-fifties, and clearly America was going young, and as it goes young, it goes violent to a degree; there're more
causes around to...we were troubled by it. So I can remember having to contend with...who was it in City Council who wanted the...kind of demagogic...wanted to have a curfew...it was one of the councilmen, and Joe was working at that.

What also was clear is that what happened just a few years later...we could begin seeing it...the massive poverty that produced the poverty program explosion of the sixties was growing in North Philadelphia...but since we were working with quote Black leadership, and that leadership was part of the coalition that was doing charter reform, downtown renewal, Ed Bacon's great plans, and so forth, we weren't in that too much. And I think, in retrospect, you could say one of the issues that Joe didn't capture was the pressure from poverty, in a sense it cut below the level of leadership perception we had at the time.

But, other issues were kind of a lot of bread and butter issues. As I recall the question of whether or not the capital budget was adequate to take care of the hundred unsafe bridges at the time. You remember that issue?

(WMP: Yes.)

And one day Joe, just looking up from Bailey's or whatever his name...oh, Henry Harral's report, and saying,...My God, there are these many bridges unsafe, and all it is is just a little bit of an alarm note on the report, and bang!...he wanted to go after that, you know.

And I never forget...trying to figure out intellectually, or ethically, what do you do if you find out that bridges are unsafe and you don't have the money to repair them.

(WMP: I don't remember any of them got repaired.)

I think probably it ended up with what...five bridges being declared in the next capital budget, the priorities checking with it, like that. But that was one of the things that we were into.

My mind goes blank a little bit past that for the other issues we've outlined, but I'm sure you know, others we'll talk about.

Now, did you think that the structure of city government provided by the new city charter of 1951 was well suited to Philadelphia at the time? I'd have to say yes. First of all, an
awful lot of thinking and logic could have gone into that, you'd know better than I, Walter; I wasn't party to that movement...just admired it from the Swarthmore distance. But it was a strong mayor charter...if anything, I suppose with Joe's nature and the publicity and everything else, it may have subordinated the council. I don't remember spending much time with the council, or you know, it was always an executive structure that I felt. It was like, you know, the good guys'd run the mayordom and now we're going to move and...oh, it was Paul D'Ortona, remember? ...the curfew man.

(WMP: Well I've interviewed Paul.)

Well you have. But those guys must have resented Joe deeply, because it was a benign dictatorship in many ways, which the charter enabled, and I suppose he paid the price for it, too, in the sense that it forced the less articulate, the less privileged in Philadelphia...it forced them in the direction of the Tates, and ultimately, more demagogic leadership which, I think Rizzo represents. And we may have been...the charter, by allowing us to move quickly without too much debate and argument, you know, may have encouraged that. But I don't think so; I think it was not in the charter, I think it was in the time. It was in the situation. So, I would have said yes, as far as I recall the charter being of influence, it was that it gave Joe and us...men in the white hats, really a chance to run.

The managing director thing seems to have worked pretty well at the time, although I think commissioners understandably resented that they were subordinate. Is that a fair memory? Do you have that?

(WMP: I think that's correct.)

Yeah. That too much kind of got...attention got to that office, and Joe did depend heavily on the managing director, Buck Sawyer, and then who was the one......

(WMP: Vernon Northrop.)

Vernon Northrop, yeah. And yeah, I'd give high marks to the charter.

Number Eight...would you say that Clark was somewhat overly engrossed with civil service and personnel problems, crucial though they were? Personnel problems, certainly, crucial though they were.
Well, I do remember that he had the patrician good government reformer's interest in civil service. Who was head of civil service at the time? 'Cause Eli Rock was an important person.

(WMP: Eli came in as a consultant on....)

Labor.

(WMP: ...labor relations.)

Yes.

(WMP: Personnel, I think.)

Mmmhmm.

(WMP: Civil service was Foster Roser?)

Foster Roser, that's right.

(WMP: Before then there was somebody else who had a heart attack and had given up, but I think Foster was...)

was the first one. Well, my feelings at the time, or memories of that time were that civil service was part of the form, the gospel by which we were moving, and I think Joe did spend a lot of time, but he probably saw it as a political commitment and a very practical expedient against the patronage system. That certainly patronage, in the traditional sense, would have eviscerated his power and muddled his image and allowed those guys over there to gain more control.

(WMP: An important change, I think, in the charter, was that the civil service commission was appointed by the mayor, under the 1951 city charter, whereas before that, it had been appointed by City Council. Reminds you what a difference that would make.)

That's a much quicker explanation of the same mean bottom outcome that I think I saw, which Joe had to be identified with it. It gave him power and I'm sure that if he'd come in two mayorships later, he would have been swearing at it. Because probably, by that time, he would have thought about the cumbersomeness of the system, etc., etc., etc.

He also had fair...the charter, as I recall, gave him fairly generous appointment powers, didn't it? I know I was a confidential appointee, we called it at the time.

(WMP: There were many boards and commissions you see, to put good people on.)
Yup. So I'd probably have to say that to a degree... civil service is a good system. It must have reached its high point at that time. But again, it depends upon your perception. I was on the side that benefited, I think.

Now, therefore, I don't think that he spent too much...he was too engrossed. It seemed to me he had to be engrossed...it was his issue...his bread and butter.

(WMP: Well, I found him less interested in public improvements, what the city planning commission was doing. Maybe that was because it was so much my baby, rather than his. He seemed to me always focusing on civil service and administrative matters, rather than the long-range future of the city...developments which needed to get underway. Probably didn't totally neglect them or anything, but his heart wasn't in it the way he was in civil service.)

Well, I think you're absolutely right. Let me give you little bits and pieces in favor of your point of view, and maybe some explanation.

We were talking about his greater interest in management organization, functioning short-run, than in the long-run capital improvement, you know, the whole plan for the city.

I think there're some interesting psychological explanations. Number one, he told me, one time, that he'd gone through a very troubled period in his own life, which he ended up in the hospital in Johns Hopkins. And he....

(WMP: Nervous breakdown.)

It was a nervous breakdown, yeah. And he told me that he made a resolve never again to indulge in introspection, past what he had to...that he was going to be a man of action and no more let himself get haunted by these ambivalences and Hamlets and things that a lot of us get into. So he, I don't know if he were ever different before, but it was clear that there was a mental determination to be brisk, factual, tangible, you know, and short-run.

Part of our conversation later, when he explained to me why he wasn't going to run for mayor again...he said partly because I'm not that dedicated, but he said....I'm also a short distance runner.

(WMP: I've heard him say that too, yeah.)

Yeah...I'm not a long distance runner......and those were both
contemplative things....you know, where you speculate about what should be the right future, the planning process, the kind of thing that you were deeply interested in, and also they were long-run, and Joe was getting....he had read Lincoln Steffens. Mayors don't get out of that track....unless they get out fast.

And so he was determined it was going to be a four year stint, and while it made good sense for the city, I think he really said he'll let you guys, who were going to stick around longer, with a longer term commitment, do all that stuff. Now he liked the bricks and mortar....gave him something to dedicate....it was a tangible evidence of where he was going....but he also was terribly impatient with what Ed Bacon's process represented. There was something in him that just didn't go for that. For him it was more ..... it's police, taxes, gas, streets, you know....whatever it is, but that longer range stuff wasn't really for him. And that's the perception I had. He became impatient with Ed Bacon frequently. I think he regarded Ed as having some of the instincts of a Bob Moses or....and you know, in many respects, that strong will was competitive of his own.

(WMP: It might have been, too, that Ed was a close associate of mine, and some of his animosity to Ed...that goes off.....)

That's entirely possible. Yeah. Well, he certainly....I remember that Ed Bacon was one of the few numbers that Joe couldn't remember on the dial 'phone. I kind of made a mental calculation, you know, an observation of whom Joe would just jump to the telephone himself, or tell Marie, or somebody, you know, this is the number. But Ed's...he didn't know Ed's number.

Well, the next one. Did you know of any more successful municipal reforms since World War II than in Philadelphia under Clark and Dilworth?

I suppose they were part of a genre, at the time, part of that whole movement, Philadelphia was the most conspicuous. It was dramatic. It was big. It was after sixty-seven years of Republican misrule. It was the first to do something as dramatic as the Chinese Wall, to have had the capacity of personnel that it did. So I think probably in just about every count, let's say, it deserved the symbolic pre-eminence that it got.

I guess, probably, there were some who learned awful fast....I remember ...in my first months of being in that job, Dick Lee came down with Ed Logue in the great tour to pilgrimage
to see how we had done it. And I must say, within a year, those guys had learned an awful lot. And when you take a look at New Haven and Dick Lee, you'd have to say that that was ...that was something that would compare with Philadelphia.

(WMP: I remember hosting a lunch for him. I guess Joe Clark was out of town or something, or wasn't interested, I don't know what.)

Yeah. I can still remember, because, Ed became an emperor very fast too. But I can still remember that young man, looking as nervous as I did in his first job, you know, coming down eagerly, listening to everything we did.

Certainly Quig Newton in Denver didn't have the substance or the lasting power. Chet Morrison I can't say too much about, but they were a generation of heroic mayors, I think.

(WMP: Well, New York had pretty good mayors in that period, didn't they?)

They had Bob Wagner.

(WMP: And Lindsay?)

No, Lindsay came later. But I wouldn't give Lindsay .... Lindsay was a different time, a different ball game. I'm not sure Joe and we would have looked very good in the 1960's. But we were very good in the 1950's, in that sense.

However, there were other issues I forgot. Remember the water issue was a big one. And we created that regional compact down there. 'Member?

(WMP: Delaware River Basin Compact?)

Yes. That's right.

(WMP: That came after Joe was out of office.)

It came...the compact came afterwards, but...

(WMP: The beginning of it was getting together between Bob Meyner* and Joe Clark; Meyner came down to see Joe, I remember one day, and they set up the Delaware River Basin Advisory Committee.)

And Joe was, at that point, that was the spring of that year, Joe, by this time, had really developed confidence in me, and he let me do, from there on in, the negotiations and the con-

* Robert B. Meyner, Democrat, governor of New Jersey, 1954-'62
vening of all these people. I'd go up to Albany and New York City, Gordon Clapp and others. And I had that nice feeling of doing something in my own right at the time. So that was one of the issues.

If we had more time I'd regale you with some of the stories about when those mayors and leaders got together too, and how they would talk about...you know, the political angles of things. It was fascinating to watch.

But I'd have to....I think Philadelphia survives, but since history keeps going, I would say it was, of its time, the best. And now we have to look to other kind of images and things, because the problems are so radically different. These are not the times of hope anymore or of increasing resources. These are the seven lean years, as against the seven fat, in Joseph's imagery. And I think...I'm not sure how we would have looked on the down side...where we are right now. We depended heavily on the optimism and the symbolism of affluence at the time.

How do you account for Philadelphia's ten years of good government after so many years of corrupt rule?

Well, I think, Walter, I think you captured something earlier than anybody else, and so I think you deserve to be called the Prophet and the Beginner, because you caught that the human being wants essentially to do good things. It is...the human being wants more to be good than bad. And the nation, particularly with the war, wanted aspirations that were far more noble than they were getting out of that system in Philadelphia at the time. Philadelphia became the image of the seamier side of the American spirit.

You knew that. And you, against all the odds, I think you just had a deep faith that doing the right thing, pointing them in the right direction, would produce its own political power. And that time it's like Joshua and the Battle of Jericho. You walked around the wall seven times. And the seventh time...what...the water guy committed suicide? You know?

(WMP: You know your Bible better than I do!)

Yea. But inside the wall was corruption and you had a noble army blaring trumpets of hope around that wall. And it collapsed.

(WMP: Well, there were an awful lot of people in the act, too. The business community got active.)
I know. But that was because you sold a coalition of decency at the time. They had to be better too. Their bread and butter rested on it. But you also know, if you go back in your history, it wouldn't have happened unless one person... it could have been you...predictably, another person could have come in a year or two, or whatever, that would say..... ...the first blast on the trumpet. Then people began rallying.

Now Joe was, in that sense, a Johnny-come-lately. He benefited from what he didn't start, although it's interesting ...when I told you the story about his thoughts in India, that he wanted to go back and do something decent for America, that he could identify with this, and I think, at a critical point, it's like a relay race, you know? Joe and Dick Dilworth come at the point when you need charismatic figures on the street.

(WMP: They went right to the heart of the thing...by going into politics. I was laying groundwork ... I was never any charismatic kind of character, that those two fellows were.)

Right. And in what is the symbiotic character of that that was so remarkable, is that you had prepared all that groundwork...Joe and Dilworth then knew...it was almost like...you now needed politicians and they arrived. And the best part of it was that Joe had the managerial confidence to work beyond its political....

(WMP: Which he got out of the military.)

That's it.

(WMP: Dick had less of it. He was not in a command situation. He was in the trenches.)

And I don't think if he'd been mayor, it would have worked. I think it would have degenerated faster in political argument.

(WMP: It wouldn't have been built up in such a good structure.)

That's right. And he...Dilworth was...I love him in many ways, because he's such a dear person....was such a dear person in many ways.

(WMP: I suppose he was your friend, was he not?)

That's the point. But Joe was on the way out of the reach of the average politician and Dilworth was within reach. Because Dilworth was a rough, tough old guy; he was a politician in many ways. Joe came in as a transcendent figure. They couldn't
lay a glove on him for a long time. Then he worked so fast that they never did, until finally he came out against the gun lobby, I guess, or something like that. But I remember ....who else could have pulled off....Dilworth would have gone to the Mummers' Day Parades and Joe wouldn't be bothered. He would not let his weekends be broken up.

(WMP: He always sent his city representative.)

That's right! I remember, Walter....you go out and stand in the cold....deal with all those ethnics coming up the street!! I thought it was kind of...in a way I admired his... cool. He wouldn't let the weekends be interfered with... he wouldn't let his wife get into politics, for reasons that go beyond, that we know, because of her interest in birth control and art and so forth.

And he wouldn't let his evenings, very often, be interfered with. But then when he ran for the Senate he had to change his image. And he started going to Mummers' Day Parades, as I recall. But there was a consistency about this formidable person that added to his political strength, or his political invulnerability.

But I think if Joe had ever had to descend into where Dilworth wouldn't mind descending at all, into the rough and tough of fighting with the average politician...no way.

(WMP: Would you say that Joe's fame sort of spread through a good part of Pennsylvania, the eastern part, particularly, that made it possible for him to grab the nomination for Senate perhaps more than anything else?)

I think so. As I say, I don't think Dave Lawrence, who would be much more instinctively an ethnic politician....wouldn't have chosen Joe as a favorite for that job. He just had to take it.

(WMP: Remember Hal Schneidman ?)

Yeah.

(WMP: He had a tremendous program of information over television and radio and the Sunday newspaper and what not. I think that did a lot to get Joe a high ....)

Joe's recognition factor was very high and I'm sure the approval rate was high too. Even when people swore at him for being ...quote...a social snob, you know.
So I would think that the ten years is easily explainable. I just wish in many respects, that time and other things had allowed a different thing to happen afterwards. But the progression was predictable. Joe knew it when he left office. He knew where it was going.

Now ...talk briefly about you career and accomplishments afterwards. Oh, hold on. What are the reasons why I left Clark administration ...became obvious....that the coronary made a great difference, and the feeling that I had to go on and protect my family, which the Ford Foundation represented.

And also that feeling that I had to distinguish myself as a personality...that if I stayed too much as a second man... that's maybe a selfish statement, but it's a very honest statement. And I must say, my relationships with Joe subsequently proved that that was not a bad thing to do. We respected each other as two different persons and it's that affection that survives, I think.

Afterwards I went to the Ford Foundation and the experience in Philadelphia accounted for, what I think...what I feel was a successful twelve years in the Ford Foundation. I went there when they were all thinking about God and the United Nations and the cosmos...and I came in and saw that those leaping millions....when I was there it went from twenty-five million expenditures....when I was there it went from twenty-five million expenditures a year to two hundred and fifty million.

And I said...look, let's work out America's urban problems. And they had shown some interest, but since all the power fights in the Ford Foundation were around those more elevated things, they let me work into the vacuum. And I took over their urban program. The fact that I'd developed a network of all these people, from Healey to all the other mayors, accounted for the fact that I wanted to take the Ford Foundation right down to where all the problems were, and moved out of the academic game quite early, because, what was happening....the academics had a monopoly on foundation money. But when we expanded our funds so much, all it did was create inflation in the academic part. A project that was worth twenty-five thousand suddenly became two and a half million. And I said it was about time that the academic competed with the real folk out there working at the job.

So I started getting mayors and cities as the clients of the Ford Foundation, not just the universities. And since, as I say, it didn't compete with the other power groups in the Ford Foundation, I just hit the time right. And with Bob Weaver being just lost out of the Harriman administration, Bob came to work
for me, and we created the prototypes then of the poverty program, of the model cities program. But that is directly attributable to my experience and contacts established in the city.

And then subsequently, as you know, I left when McBundy, who was a man of a different spirit than mine, came to be president of Ford Foundation...and left rather abruptly, because I didn't want to stay with what I saw, so mixed motivations come in there.

That's when Dick Hughes asked if I would take over his new department of community affairs, and when Joe Clark, with whom I talked, said ...Dick is a great guy. Go to work for him. And I did and never regretted, even though Bobby Kennedy told me I shouldn't, because I would lose my reputation in New Jersey. And instead, I walked on water. My time in New Jersey was kind of like Philadelphia had been for you and Joe Clark. The right circumstance, the right situation, and even though this time we were dealing with killings.... I had Newark and in three months Newark broke and I was responsible for most of that. There was the State Police and I were the ones who were supposed to ride, pocket to gun, together, and try to ameliorate those conditions.

And because of the work I'd done in the Ford Foundation, again, I was in a good position. So those three years were magic years for me in that office. I would very much like to have had those magic years a decade or so earlier.

Then I was going to run for governor, or the Senate, and actually got into it a bit, until I realized several things. That our kind of people who had presided over the the fifties and sixties...we were having to give way to Nixon...Nixonry, and I'd taken a position with the police, which was not very popular, so there was a feeling that Ylvisaker was a long-haired intellectual and a nigger-lover, you know, that kind of thing. And it would have taken two million dollars to fight, either in the Senate or the gubernatorial contestant primary and the election. And so I side-lined myself, went to Princeton for two years, planned on waiting and watching and noticing that it wasn't going to break.

(WMP: Is that when you dealt with David Bird?

When I was commissioner, it was with David Bird. He came in to do consulting on our housing program. But just teaching turned out to be kind of boring. I should add to this, the physical side still influences it. In '64, I was told I was going blind and so I've pieced my life in separate segments. I figured I had only three years to go so I took the exciting last three years of my career as a commissioner, in the department of community affairs, a new department.
Then in 1970 - '72 at Princeton, I figured ...well, I'd gently retire into being a blind professor. But my eyes didn't go. I found some medical relief and so I decided it's time to go back to work and since I can't get to be governor, I was vulnerable when Harvard called and asked if I'd become head of the Graduate School of Education.

Another alternative was to go to Swarthmore as its president. And I didn't want to go back to where I'd fight with old friends. And came up here in a surprising move, and so I've been dean here for the last five years, but still keeping my hand in a whole lot of other things. I'm still more of an urbanist than I am an educator, I think. And that's where that brings us.

(WMP: You've got very good recall.)

Now, let's see what we've got here. That takes care of eleven and twelve and the last question...the baker's dozen, is...were you involved in the grant of the Ford Foundation money to Penjerdel in Philadelphia? And if you were, would you tell about it and assess its accomplishments.

Well, actually, what I did, when I went to Ford, we developed first a program to get at the metropolitan governmental problems. Still the image of your charter reform, you know, that that was the next step ...if we cleaned up the city, now let's get some rationality into the metropolitan areas. So I conceived the program for the Ford Foundation which ultimately gave quite a few grants, large grants, to metropolitan area, Pittsburgh metropolitan area, Cleveland, Saint Louis, and Washington, Boston, and then I said...I can't be doing this without bringing money back to my favorite town. And that's when you recall, we went into those strange kinds of coalitions and alliances to produce Penjerdel. With John Bodine, with Steve, let's see, what was his name...the head of the Federal Reserve...

(WMP: Al Williams?)

Al Williams. It was almost like taking the coalition that you put together and putting it back to work on the metropolitan problems. But we all underestimated, I think, the centrifical forces that operate, and also the relative weakness of even the most powerful establishment to transcend those centrifical...or to overcome those centrifical forces. The result was that Penjerdel never really had a constituency. It kind of limped along with its funding, I think did good research work, you know, thought work, but I never had the feeling that that or just about any other, really had any force. Couldn't capture one city hall as we did in Philadelphia, with a charter
which would allow you to operate.

Now I think that that Penjerdel, you'd have counted a failure in the terms that it did not survive, did not have much force....can be credited with making ....giving a pattern which has been followed by HUD in its regional reviews and its COGS, its Councils on Governments, which have now become boiler plate around the nation. By the way, which haven't gotten to be much stronger or more effective than Penjerdel, but at least Penjerdel gave a model for that.

And another thing I brought back was PCCA, which you didn't ask about. The Philadelphia Council for Community Advancement.

(WMP: Yes. That was John Patterson's, wasn't it?)

Yes. Now what I did after the governmental stuff, I became aware in the late fifties of the growing social restiveness in the ghettos, and saw how we had ignored that and much of the planning and programming that we did...I still remember Ed Bacon laying out the city physically, doing brilliant work, but here right next door became the people that Leon Sullivan subsequently organized in just as heroic a way.

So I created the program which became the advance of the poverty program and again we went this time to Boston, New Haven, Washington, the whole state of North Carolina under Terry Sanford, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh was part of that, but Oakland was actually the first. Those programs, PCCA was one of them, '60 - '62, were leaped upon by Johnson, when he created the poverty program. And they became the models of community action.

The Philadelphia Council of Community Advancement was created, one of the later ones, under Sam Dash...announced just at the time when the ghetto had become militant and when they had their own spokespersons, and our old friend, the head of the NAACP, who, I see, is still active in the same role...blasted it, and told the Ford Foundation that the old ghetto is not going to buy Ford cars anymore, and damn near destroyed it.

(WMP: Who was that?)

Oh, he was at the time the head of NAACP.

(WMP: Nationally?)

No, in Philadelphia. He also took on the Lincoln situation recently, too. But, he's a demagogic figure. But it was just ripe for him and it really blew Abe Freedman and others, kind of, out of the water.
It was at that point that we made an alliance with Leon Sullivan, which, by the fact that we would help Leon, we became more honest in their community. But it did cause a lot of people pain because it was again, that old coalition...that you had whelped the Philadelphia...that first trip to work on the metropolitan problem, and then began to work on the ghetto problem. But it was too much of paternalism by this time, and Leon Sullivan is where we had to pick up to work in more natural, indigenous way.

So I found that the grant that we then gave to Leon Sullivan actually was far more effective than the money given to PCCA. Although PCCA did become the beginning point of Philadelphia's poverty program.

So you can see that I never forgot Philadelphia.

(WMP: Well you covered a lot of ground. It's wonderful to remember so much.)

Well, it just proves how much a dent it made in my life, Walter.